
Class _^4LO. 
Book 1 



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Copyright N?_ 



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COPYRISHT DEPOSIT. 



MOTORING THROUGH 
NORTHERN ITALY 

NAPOLEON'S FIRST CAMPAIGN 



MOTORING THROUGH 
NORTHERN ITALY 



NAPOLEON'S FIRST 
CAMPAIGN 



BY 

CHARLES PORTER KIMBALL 




CHICAGO 

PRIVATELY PRINTED 

1911 



^ ^ iA v^ 



Copyright, 1911, by 
Charles Porter Kimball 



CCi.A2920G4 




MOTORING THROUGH 
NORTHERN ITALY 



|T was with the intention of visiting the 
battlefields of Napoleon Bonaparte's first 
campaign that we decided to take a motor 
trip through northern Italy. There it was 
that the great Corsican laid the foundation 
of his glory. It was through Italy that he 
subjugated France. So, early one bright July morning in 
1910, with a typically hot Italian sun and the concierge of 
the Eden Palace Hotel, the only ones up early enough 
to see us off, we left Genoa in an Itala machine, with Ales- 
sandria our destination for the first day's run. For some 
distance the road follows the Mediterranean, turning innumer- 
able sharp angles, thereby endangering many a collision with 
peasants in market wagons — on whom the chauffeur vented 
his anger in true Italian style. Not only were we obliged 
to stop in order that we might argue the better as to which 
had the right of way, but at most railroad crossings the gates 
would be lowered a good ten minutes before the train so 
much as put in an appearance, and only by the inducement 
of a few coppers would the woman with the red flag consent 
to let us pass. We turned inland at Savona, ascending the 
slopes of the Apennines, and stopped at the crossroads of 
Carcare. This is the fork which Napoleon had seized after 
the battle of Montennotte, as it was of great strategic value 

7 



MOTORING THROUGH 




Castle of Cosseria 



— the road to the left leading to Turin and that to the right 
to Milan. We left the main road in order to get some 
pictures of the castle of Cosseria, after which we went on 
to Millessimo. After returning to Carcare we soon reached 
Cairo where we had an uneatable lunch at a queer old 
tavern. In some miraculous way the daughter of the house 
managed to relieve the pockets of my duster of all that 
they contained while we, blissfully ignorant of the fact, 



NORTHERN ITALY 9 

were in the meantime paying for the meal, the greater part 
of which we fed to the dog. In three hours more we 
were in our little hotel at Alessandria where we had planned 
to spend the night — never supposing that the distance was 
so short. 

When Napoleon Bonaparte, appointed Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army of Italy in March, 1796, arrived in Nice, 
he found the army in a pitiable state. It had been utterly 
neglected during the winter by the Directory — it had very 
little money, its generals were demoralized, there was cor- 
ruption connected with the administration, and the soldiers 
were half starved and half clothed. It appeared anything but 
a bright prospect to Napoleon. At first the older generals 
looked askance at the young Corsican and grumbled at being 
superseded by a young man of twenty-six who had little 
experience in war. But Bonaparte soon showed his char- 
acter, by his punishment of the government officials who 
were robbing the army, his personal zeal, and the pains he 
exerted to have his men well fed and clothed. He issued 
a very stirring proclamation, foretelling his victories and the 
triumphant march through Italy, thereby raising the spirits 
of the army. To better illustrate his strategy, it might be 
advisable to describe the position of the opposing armies. 
The divisions of Serurier and Augereau, about 15,000 strong, 
were spread out along the upper Tanaro valley down to the 
sea, from which point to beyond Savona were 17,000 men 
under Massena and La Harpe. The troops of the Allies 
were poorly distributed, as they were stretched out for more 
than sixty miles and inter-communication between the various 
parts was almost impossible owing to the mountain ranges 
separating them. Colli, commanding the Piedmontese, stood 
along the roads from Coni to Millessimo, with about 25,000 
men; and the Austrians, 35,000 strong under Beaulieu, a 



lo MOTORING THROUGH 

veteran of the Seven Years' War, lay spread out from the 
Bochetta Pass, north of Genoa, to Dego. Napoleon saw 
the false position in which the enemy had placed itself, with 
its strength at both ends of a long line, and a weak center. 
To weaken their center still further, he bluffed Beaulieu into 
supposing that Genoa was the point of the French attack. 
Napoleon had previously warned that city that on account 
of their violation of neutrality he was going to punish them 
and this news was immediately transmitted to Beaulieu who 
had orders from Vienna to protect Genoa at any cost. 
Curiously enough nine years later the Republic of Genoa 
voluntarily gave up its independence and contented itself 
with becoming the principal town in the 27th military divi- 
sion of the Empire. Consequently, Cervoni's march on Voltri 
alarmed Beaulieu who reinforced Sebottendorf and ordered the 
latter to arrest the French advance. Another Austrian force of 
10,000 troops under Argenteau was ordered to debouch from 
Sassello to Savona. Beaulieu supposed that between these two 
columns the advance guard of the French would be cut off 
and destroyed. The Austrian general could not have played 
better into Napoleon's hands. On April loth, while Cervoni 
held Sebottendorf's superior numbers in check, Bonaparte 
quickly brought up Augereau, Massena and La Harpe to 
attack Argenteau 's column which had been arrested by 
Rampon, with 1,200 men, in the redoubt at Montennotte. 
The Austrians were not prepared for an attack in such 
force and had to beat a disastrous retreat to Dego with a 
loss of 2,500 men. On this day Napoleon wrote to Massena: 
"Everything assures us that the work of to-day and that of 
to-morrow will tell in history." Some years later when the 
Emperor of Austria asked Napoleon whence he dated his 
nobility, he replied calmly: ** Sire, from the day of the battle 
of Montennotte." Beaulieu, who accompanied Sebottendorf's 



NORTHERN ITALY 



1 1 



column, learning of the combat at Montennotte, saw the 
uselessness of a further advance towards Savona and ordered 
his troops to reach Dego by such mountain roads as were 
available. Napoleon now turned his attention to Colli and 
sent 10,000 men against him via Millessimo and ordered 
Serurier to advance down to Tanaro. On the 13th Augereau 
struck a force under Provera, in the castle of Cosseria. 




Adda — Lodi 



From want of water and ammunition, the Sardinian general 
was obliged to surrender next day with 1,500 men. On the 
14th Napoleon turned his attention to the Austrians again 
and attacked Dego, which fell by evening. It was here that 
Bonaparte for the first time noticed Lannes in action, as he 
led a brisk bayonet charge which drove the Austrians out 
of the town. In these three or four days, Napoleon had 
worked so rapidly and successfully that he had pierced the 
center of the Allies, causing them a loss of about 9,000 



12 MOTORING THROUGH 

troops, and set Beaulieu to collecting his scattered soldiers 
for the bare protection of Lombardy. The Austrians were 
now fully cut off from Colli, and Napoleon determined to 
crush the latter before Beaulieu could gather enough men 
to come to his assistance. On the 28th a truce was signed 
between France and Piedmont at Cherasco, whereby Napoleon 
got possession of the three fortresses of Coni, Alessandria and 
Tortona. As Bonaparte said in his proclamation of April 
26th, the French army had won six victories, taken twenty- 
one flags, fifty-five guns and fifteen thousand prisoners and 
killed or wounded more than ten thousand men in a fortnight. 
He ended with the fulfilled prediction, "And if, victors of 
Toulon, you foretold the immortal campaign of 1796, your 
present victories foretell a yet finer one." 

Our second day's run was from Alessandria to Milan, by 
way of Placentia. We left early in the morning, and after 
paying the large sum of one franc for our garage bill, struck 
the broad highway which leads to Tortona. A few miles 
out of Alessandria we came upon the famous battlefield of 
Marengo, where four years later Napoleon won a memorable 
victory over the Austrians which brought peace to the Conti- 
nent for several years. From Tortona we followed the same 
road over which the special column under Gen. Dallemagne 
made its famous march to Placentia. Here we stopped for 
lunch. After partaking of a meal, consisting principally 
of soup and fruit, as the rest of the menu was too strongly 
Italian for us, we again set out, and within an hour or so 
reached Lodi. We crossed the long bridge and thought of 
the courage it must have required to rush over in the face 
of cannon. We were so glad at about four o'clock to perceive 
in the distance the familiar spires and lace-work of the Milan 
Cathedral looming up ahead of us, as we wanted to see as 
much of that famous city as we could before darkness set in. 



NORTHERN ITALY 



13 



To return to the Austrians, BeauHeu had decided that 
it would be impossible to remain on the right bank of 
the Po and had consequently crossed the Valentia on May 
1st. He took up his position at Valeggio, and along the 
north bank of the Po as far as the Ticino. Napoleon, in 
his negotiations with the Piedmontese, stipulated that he 
was to have permission to cross the Po near Valentia, 




Bridge over Adda at Lodi 



without having the slightest intention of so doing, however. 
Beaulieu did not suspect the bluff and prepared to meet 
their supposed crossing. Bonaparte saw that by holding 
the Austrians opposite Valencia, he might cross the Po 
further down with little resistance and thereby turn their 
position. Consequently, on May 6th a special corps, under 
Gen. Dallemagne, started its march for Placentia, while 
Serurier at Valencia and Massena at Salo, kept the Aus- 
trians from suspecting this turning manoeuvre. On the 



14 MOTORING THROUGH 

7th the head of Dallemagne's column reached Placentia, 
after marching from Tortona, 45 miles, in thirty-six hours. 
The lack of a pontoon bridge prevented Napoleon from 
dealing the Austrians a fatal blow, for the crossing, by means 
boats, was necessarily slow. By the 8th Liptay, with 5,000 
men, had come up and struck the French column at 
Fombio where, during the night, La Harpe was killed by 
the fire of some of his own men. Liptay was forced back 
on Pizzighetone with considerable loss, and Beaulieu, by 
this time realizing the full meaning of the French crossing 
at Placentia and the danger of his being cut in two, gave 
immediate orders for a complete withdrawal behind the Adda 
and concentration at Cremona. He left Sebottendorf with 
12,000 troops at Lodi to act as rear guard. During the 
8th and 9th Massena's and Augereau's divisions crossed 
at Placentia and pushed forward to Borghetto where, at 
3 A. M. on the tenth, Napoleon joined the former's division. 
On Dallemagne's reporting that Lodi was held in force, orders 
were at once issued for the various divisions to march thither. 
Before noon the French van reached Lodi, which was soon 
taken by Dallemagne's grenadiers. The Austrians, in their 
retreat, were followed so closely by the French troops that 
they could not destroy the bridge, and Napoleon, seeing this, 
ordered batteries to open fire on those across the river and 
give time for Augereau's and Massena's troops, 12,000 in 
all, to come up. At 7 P. M. the grenadiers, formed in a 
deep column, dashed upon the long bridge shouting "Vive 
La Republic." They were brought to a standstill by the 
enemy's fire and only rallied by the exertions of their chiefs — 
Dallemagne, Massena, Berthier, Lannes and Napoleon — who, 
without a moment's hesitation led them forward again. The 
first Austrian line and all the guns were captured and soon 
Sebottendorf, seeing the impossibility of keeping his men in 



NORTHERN ITALY 15 

good order, retreated toward Cremona. Some military critics 
have blamed Napoleon for his attack on the bridge at Lodi, 
claiming that it would have been wiser and safer to have 
turned the Austrian position by crossing further up the river 
just as Beaumont's cavalry division actually did. The fact 
of the matter is that Napoleon wished to give an example of 
his courage and Lodi was the first chance he had of doing 
this, for, though it was not a great strategic feat, it was 
extremely bold. Others claim that after he had accomplished 
his purpose, he should have followed Sebottendorf's division 
more closely than he did and Beaulieu himself admitted that 
Napoleon could have gained the city of Mantua, as it was 
totally unprepared for a siege. The French troops, however, 
had had no rest for nearly a month and Napoleon realized 
that Beaulieu had the start and it would be extremely hard 
to catch him before he reached Mantua. Futhermore he 
thought it better to establish French rule over what had 
already been gained rather than advance prematurely. The 
battle of Lodi and the capture of Pizzighetone, two days 
later, gave the French the whole course of the Adda and 
opened the gates of Milan to Napoleon. 

On our third day's tour we set out bright and early, 
bound for Mantua. We had lunch at Brescia and had 
the pleasure of being served by a waiter who spoke fairly 
good English. It seemed so strange that a man who had 
been energetic enough to go all the way to London in order 
to speak her language should bury himself in such a small 
town, especially one unfrequented by tourists. The scenery 
that afternoon was the most beautiful so far, as the greater 
part of the road ran along the Lake of Garda. Our first view 
of the lake was from the heights above Salo — a never-to-be- 
forgotten sight — with the color of the water the most intense 
dark blue, within which the sky was reflected and as a back- 



i6 MOTORING THROUGH 

ground the high dark mountains making a perfect frame for 
this marvelous painting of Nature. We left the lake at 
Desenzano and passed through Lonato and Castiglione. 
Crossing the Mincio at Goito we followed the road along the 
left bank and shortly reached the broad expanse of water that 
surrounds Mantua. The city itself, on account of the narrow 
streets and enclosing walls, was extremely hot and stifling. 
The only hotel that the place can boast of was charming — 
the restaurant being out of doors in a courtyard. Mantua 
having a large garrison, we saw more soldiers there than in 
any other city where we had stopped. 

The defeat at Lodi determined Beaulieu to seek safety 
behind the Mincio, towards which river the French advanced 
from the Adda the last week in May. Again the Austrian 
commander was duped as to the real point of crossing, and 
on the 30th, Kilmaine, with the van, forced a passage at Val- 
eggio, the other divisions following. The Austrians were so 
demoralized that they retired behind the Adige and assembled 
at Dolce. Napoleon had to take Mantua before advancing 
any further, and it was that siege and the various attempts to 
relieve it that occupied the attention of both leaders. Bona- 
parte established his headquarters at Roverbella, whence he 
could watch the siege of Mantua, and take care of any Aus- 
trian advance down the Adige valley. Of the 42,000 French 
troops, Massena's corps was stationed about Verona, those of 
Serurier and Augereau were besieging Mantua, and Dalle- 
mange's grenadiers, with the division of Vaubois from the 
Army of the Alps, were at Roverbella. During June and 
July Napoleon wrote repeatedly for reinforcements, as reports 
had come in that Beaulieu's successor, Wurmser, with 25,000 
veterans from the Rhine, was ordered to relieve Mantua. 
The siege of that city had been carried on actively in spite of 
the fact that French were far from being well equipped for it, 



NORTHERN ITALY 



17 



having only 140 heavy guns against 3 16. Two attempts were 
made in July to take the place by assault, but they failed, 
and a siege bombardment was resorted to. Towards the end 
of July Wurmser began his advance for the relief of Mantua. 
Dividing his army into two columns, he sent Quosdonavich, 
with 18,000 troops around Lake Garda, and with the main 
body of about 30,000 troops, prepared descend the Adige from 




Bridge leading to Mantua 



Trent. The Austrian commander thought the French would 
be forced to fall back immediately to the right bank of the 
Po, and consequently ordered Quosdonavich, after taking 
Brescia, to seize Placentia and cut off Napoleon's retreat. 
Had he been dealing with any other general than Bonaparte 
no doubt he would have reasoned correctly, for the French 
were in a ticklish position. The enemy by the 29th had 
broken through the French lines at Rivoli, Salo and Brescia. 
Although Napoleon feared he would have to give up the line 



i8 MOTORING THROUGH 

of the Mincio, he was determined not to retreat without a 
struggle. After fully collecting himself, he saw the mistake 
Wurmser had made in separating his superior army into so 
many columns that if attacked separately, would prove too 
weak for the combined French army. Montennotte had 
taught the Austrians nothing, for they still clung to the idea 
of an advance in many columns. Napoleon decided to fall 
on the division of Quosdonavich and ordered Sauret to retake 
Salo and Massena to give up Verona and take post at Lonato. 
As every man was needed to meet the Austrian advance, the 
siege of Mantua was raised, and Serurier and Augereau given 
orders to assemble at Valeggio, whence they were hurried to 
Montechiaro. The French were now entirely massed on the 
west side of the Mincio prepared to bring superior numbers 
against the column of Quosdonavich. Wurmser, in the 
meantime, reaching Valleggio July 31st, determined to cross 
the Mincio and fall on the rear of the French, and had he 
done so promptly, might have seriously inconvenienced Napo- 
leon's plans, but fortunately for the latter, he visited Mantua 
first, leaving Bayalich at Peschiera and Liptay at Goito. 
The former, crossing the Mincio, marched on Lonato, from 
whence Massena was obliged to retire to Porte San Marco. 
Liptay, crossing at Goito and pushing on to Montechiaro, 
was met by Augereau 's troops returning from that place and 
driven back beyond CastigHone. On the 4th of August 
Wurmser detached two columns on useless errands, whereas 
Napoleon used every available man for the coming battle. 
"When you want to deliver battle, assemble all your forces; 
neglect none of them; a battalion sometimes decides a day," 
was one of the foremost rules of Napoleon's strategy. When 
the battle began Wurmser made the mistake of stretching out 
his right towards Lonato, hoping to effect a union with 
Quosdonavich, whose retreat around Lake Gorda he did not 



NORTHERN ITALY 



19 



know of. Massena held the Austrian right, while Serurier 
and Kilmaine pressed in the enemy's left, and at the critical 
moment, Augereau assaulted their center, which had been 
weakened too much by Wurmser's effort to stretch out his 
right too far and to reinforce his left against the cavalry 
attacks of Kilmaine. Wurmser saw his mistake too late and 
realized that he must retreat at once to save his army, and this 




Adige Valley 



he did, though with considerable loss. On the 6th Massena 
advanced against Peschiera and Augereau against Valeggio. 
But there was little fighting as Wurmser retired to Trent. 
The French troops took the same position they had occupied 
in July and the siege of Mantua — which Wurmser had rein- 
forced by seven battalions — was resumed. 

To return to our trip, it was well that we left Mantua 
early in the morning, as we were obliged to leave the main 
road in order to go to Areola, and this took us longer than 



20 MOTORING THROUGH 

we had anticipated. It was well worth our trouble, however, 
as we found there an interesting old monument commemorat- 
ing Napoleon's famous victory. Passing through Caldiero, 
we reached Verona about noon. From there up the Adige 
valley there was quite a noticeable difference in the air as well 
as the scenery. Our approaching the Alps was, of course, 
what caused these changes, for Trent, where we intended to 
stop for the night, is right in the midst of the Tyrolean moun- 
tains. The most difficult part of the whole trip was, perhaps, 
our wishing to see the battlefield of Rivoli. We were obliged, 
after leaving the main highway and going to a certain point of 
the river, to drive the car on to a ferry just large enough to 
hold it, and then by means of a pulley and the assistance of 
the current, we crossed slowly to the other bank. Our path 
was now a narrow winding one, and as there were sentries all 
along, and we were obliged to pass through the gates of the 
fort, we naturally were unable to take away with us anything 
more than a mental picture. We reached Trent late in the 
afternoon and found an excellent hotel. It is quite modern 
and the meals most enjoyable, especially when eaten out on 
the huge veranda with the keen air as an appetizer. Al- 
though we were obliged to go indoors at dinner on account of 
the rain, we had little idea of the consequences a storm in the 
mountains meant, but we soon learned by experience. 

Towards the end of August Wurmser again made plans 
for the relief of Mantua, which required a division of forces. 
Davidovich, with 20,000 troops, was ordered to guard the 
approach to Trent, as well as the upper Adige valley, while 
Wurmser, with 25,000 men, descended the Brenta valley to 
Bassano. The fact that he supposed the French would be 
forced to fall back behind the Mincio, showed how little the 
Austrian commander had learned from his previous campaign. 
On September ist Napoleon ordered Massena and Augereau to 



NORTHERN ITALY 



21 



advance up the Adige, and Vaubois up the Chiese around the 
Lake of Garda to Mori, where all three divisions were to 
unite. Several fierce battles were fought at Roveredo and 
Caliano, for, although the French had a superiority of 
numbers, the Austrians had the advantage of good defensive 
positions. The French fought brilliantly and after capturing 
some three thousand prisoners at Caliano drove Davidovich 




Monument at Areola 



in disorder back to Trent. Wurmser should have recalled 
those troops which were along the Brenta, to reinforce David- 
ovich, but instead, he hastened to Bassano, with the object of 
seizing the lower Adige and falling on the rear of the French. 
On the morning of the 5th Massena entered Trent. David- 
ovich should have retired through the Brenta valley and 
rejoined his chief, but his orders from Vienna held him in the 
Tyrol, to prevent Napoleon from advancing and joining 
Moreau near Innsbruck. On the 8th Napoleon overtook 



22 MOTORING THROUGH 

Wurmser at Bassano, where a battle was fought which resulted 
in the utter rout of the Austrians. They lost nearly 5,000 
prisoners, 35 guns, 200 ammunition wagons and five flags of 
which two were taken by Lannes himself. Wurmser and the 
treasury came within a minute or two of being captured. 
Napoleon followed up this victory with his usual promptitude, 
hoping to catch and cut off Wurmser before he reached 
Mantua. One accident after another prevented him, how- 
ever, and on the 12th Wurmser, at the head of only 12,000 
troops, entered Mantua, to become one of the besieged 
instead of a liberator. In less than two weeks the third 
Austrian army had been defeated with a loss of more than 
15,000 in killed, wounded or prisoners. But Napoleon's 
position, in spite of his many victories, was serious, and he 
wrote the Directory that unless they wished to lose what had 
already been gained, they must send him more troops, as he 
now had less than 30,000. The French reverses on the 
Rhine had cut off hopes of reinforcements from that direction. 
Austria would not listen to peace negotiations until she had 
recovered Lombardy, and she intended to try again to raise 
the siege of Mantua. Venice might declare war on France, 
and she could put 20,000 troops into the field. The Pope 
had broken the terms of his armistice, and by the death of 
the king of Sardinia, the attitude of Piedmont again became 
questionable. Meanwhile, by the end of October, Austria 
once more prepared to relieve Mantua. Davidovich, with 
20,000 troops, had orders to take Trent, while another army 
of 30,000 under Alvinzi, was to recapture Bassano. These 
two columns were to unite at Verona and Wurmser was 
notified to get ready to make a sortie at the proper time. 
The one thing in Napoleon's favor was that the Austrians 
were again operating against him on divergent lines and he 
hoped to be able to repeat his former movements against 



NORTHERN ITALY 23 

Wurmser — this time, however, to beat Alvinzi and hurry up 
the Brenta valley and attack Davidovich in his rear. But 
this was not to be, for not only did the latter push Vaubois 
before him, but Napoleon failed to inflict a decisive blow on 
Alvinzi. On November 8th the latter had got as far as 
Vicenza, with 27,000 troops, and Davidovich with 16,000 as 
far as Roverdero. Napoleon at this time was at Verona with 




Brenta Valley 

21,000 and Vaubois at La Corona with 8,000. By the nth, 
Alvinzi had moved to Villanova. Napoleon sent Massena 
up the Adige valley to gauge the situation, for if Davidovich 
advanced he determined to fall on him first and crush him, 
so as to keep his line of communications through Peschiera. 
Massena, however, reported that Davidovich was inactive, as 
the latter had heard that Vaubois had received reinforcements. 
Had Alvinzi pushed rapidly on to Verona, Davidovich forced 
Vaubois back, and Wurmser made a sortie, it would have 



24 MOTORING THROUGH 

seemed as if the total Austrian force of 65,000 would have 
been able to overwhelm the French army of 45,000. But 
time and speed did not enter into the calculations of the 
Austrian commanders. On the afternoon of the nth, Napo- 
leon took the offensive and drove the advance Austrian van 
back on Caldiero, where during the night they entrenched 
themselves. On the 12th Napoleon attacked, but a driving 
rainstorm blew in the faces of the French troops, and by the 
time Massena came up, Alvinzi's main body arrived and 
Bonaparte was forced to retreat to Verona. The worst part 
of this defeat was that all the best generals were wounded — 
Joubert, Lannes, Victor, Murat and Rampon. Napoleon's 
situation was most perilous and any other general would 
immediately have ordered a retreat behind the Mincio. 
There was one chance left and Napoleon determined to 
try that rather than retreat. A force of three thousand 
men was left in Verona with orders to hold it at any cost, 
and on the evening of the 14th Napoleon marched his men 
out of the Milan gate and headed towards the west. No 
doubt the soldiers expected it was a retreat behind the 
Mincio. But soon the army turned south and headed 
rapidly down the Adige towards Ronco, where Napoleon 
had ordered a bridge to be built, and on the morning of 
the 15th the French army crossed. Had it not been for 
a few Hungarian regiments in Areola, the surprise would 
have been complete and Alvinzi taken in flank and rear, 
but the marshes between Ronco and Areola, having only 
one causeway, rendered a quick advance impossible. For 
three days the battle raged and not until the i8th did 
Alvinzi, reduced to 15,000 troops, retire to the Brenta. 
The French had been lucky in the fact that Davidovich 
had not moved until the 17th, on which day he pushed 
Vaubois back to Paschiera. Napoleon now turned his 



NORTHERN ITALY 



25 



attention to Davidovich who, hearing of Alvinzi's retreat, 
retired up the Adige valley. During this short campaign 
the Austrians had lost over 20,000 troops, but by January, 
1797, Alvinzi, with 45,000 soldiers, was preparing the fourth 
attempt to relieve Mantua. Again the Austrian plan was 
faulty, as it provided for an advance in three columns. 
On the 7th of January, Provera with 9,000 troops, left 




Road through the valley — Brenta 

Padua, and Bayalich, with 6,000, left Bassano. Napoleon 
did not know for some time from which quarter the main 
Austrian body would advance, and until he was certain, he 
made no move. Joubert's report of the Austrian advance 
on La Corona cleared up the situation and Napoleon judged, 
rightly, that the chief column was that advancing down the 
Adige. Joubert with his small division had abandoned La 
Corona on the I2th and retired to Rivoli, where, on the 
13th, he was attacked by the Austrian van. His dispatches 



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